| Battle of Zahleh معركة زحلة |
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| Part of the Lebanese Civil War | |||||||
Bachir Gemayel, LF Chief Commander, addressing his resistant groups scattered across the battlefield. |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Lebanese Forces |
Syrian Armed Forces aka Arab Deterrent Force PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) The Hanache Group[2] |
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| Units involved | |||||||
| Lebanese Forces: |
Syrian Army Forces:[6]
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization):[7]
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| est. 200 killed 200 wounded Total: 400 casualties[8] |
est. 300 killed 400 wounded 32 tanks and Amored Personal Carrier Total: 700 casualties[9] |
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The Battle of Zahleh (Arabic: معركة زحلة) took place during the Lebanese Civil War, between December 1980 and June 1981. During the seven month period, the city of Zahleh (Arabic: زحلة) endured a handful of political and military setbacks. The opposing key players were on the one side, the LF (Lebanese Forces) (Arabic: القوات اللبنانية) aided by Zahlawi townspeople, and on the other side, the Syrian Army Forces also known as ADF Arab Deterrent Force (Arabic: قوات الردع العربية), aided by some PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) factions.[10] Demographically, Zahleh is one the largest predominantly Christian towns in Lebanon.[11] Adjacent to the town's outskirts, the Bekaa valley (Arabic: وادي البقاع), spanning the length of the Syrian borders. Given Zahleh's close proximity to the Bekaa Valley, the Syrian Army Forces feared a potential alliance between Israel and the LF in Zahleh. This potential alliance would not only threaten the Syrian military presence in the Bekaa valley, but was regarded as a national security threat from the Syrians' point of view, given the close proximity between Zahleh and the Damascus highway.[12] Consequently, as a clamp down strategy, the Syrian forces controlled major roads leading in and out of the city and fortified the entire Valley. Around December 1980, tension increased between Zahlawi Lebanese Forces and Syrian backed Leftist militants. From April to June 1981, throughout the four month period, a handful of LF members, aided by Zahlawi Local Resistance, confronted the Syrian war machine and defended the city from Syrian intrusion and potential invasion.
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From the start of the Civil War, the city of Zahleh’s key strategic location served as a main artery for the fighting groups involved in the conflict, particularly for the Syrian Army Forces who occupied the adjacent Bekaa Valley from May 1976.[13] Throughout history, the city of Zahleh served as a trade hub for commerce; located between Damascus on the East side, including the fertile Bekaa valley that borders Syria, and Beirut City on the opposite west side. Although Zahlawi’s readily took advantage of their location for trade and commerce, their geo-strategic location was a deterrent on the socio-political level between 1980 and 1981. From the west side, the city lies at the base of the 8,622 feet high Mount Sannine (Arabic: جبل صنين). The peak of Mount Sannine, not only overlooked the entire Bekaa Valley, but the Israeli occupied Golan heights and even further. With that said, the Syrian’s securing at least the base of Mount Sannine prevented any potential Israeli or LF attempt to scrutinize the occupied Golan Heights and further deep into Syrian territories.
Strategically, the prime concern of the Syrians was to curb the Christian controlled city’s geo-strategic attributes. Consequently, the Syrian Forces blocked the main roads leading in and out of the city. The Syrian forces, however, remained stationed outside the city, in particular, along the outskirts. The Syrian army chief of staff at the time, General Hikmat Chehabi (Arabic: حكمت شهابي) expressed concerns over a free and uncontrolled Zahleh falling into the hands of the Israeli Forces. The Israelis were providing military aid to the LF, whose presence was apparent inside Zahleh. Chehabi’s concern was, that the LF might hand over the base of mount Sannine to the Israelis, given the mount peek outlooks the Golan heights and deep inside Syrian territories. To that end, Chehabi foresaw a problematic scenario on more than one level. One, if the Israeli Forces cut through Zahleh city and position their forces along its outskirts, they would be stationed only four miles West of the Syrian fifth division in the town of Chtaura (Arabic: شتورة), located by the Beirut Damascus highway.[14] Two, such a scenario, if actualized, woud not only threaten Syrian military presence in the Valley, but even the Syrian capital itself –– the Israeli army would be 8.6 miles West of the Syrian borders and 31 miles from the Syrian capital, Damascus. For that reason, the Syrian 85th and 78th brigades along with the 7th division regrouped across the valley.[15] In addition, Chehabi armed PLO’s (Palestinian Liberation Organization) factions such as, al-Yarmouk, al-Kostol and Ain jallout positioned between the Litani River (Arabic: نهر الليطاني) and Zahrani River[16] (Arabic: نهر الزهراني).
Prior to the December setbacks, the Moukhabarat (Arabic:المخابرات السورية), the Syrian Secret Service, were congregating surreptitiously in and around the city, aiding the left-wing armed group, Hanache.[17] Tensions between the local right-wing LF and left-wing Hanache continued to increase.[18] The catalyst to the initial setbacks ensued when Hanache Group attempted to control the offices of the National Liberal Party (NLP).[19] On December 22, 1980, shootings broke out between LF local members and the Hanache group.[20] A Syrian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) that had ventured between the two opposing groups, was attacked by the LF.[21] When the Syrians attempted to retrieve their damaged vehicles and dead occupants they directly engaged with the LF.[22] During the confrontations, a total of five Syrian soldiers were killed.[23] As a result, the Syrian Forces shelled the overpopulated city for six consecutive hours, to pressure Zahlawis to hand over the militants responsible for the killing.[24] To even further increase the psychological pressure on the City, the Syrian checkpoints dispersed around the outskirts of the city blocked foodstuff and supply materials going in and out the Zahleh.[25] On the international level, the disproportionate Syrian reaction triggered a unified international criticism. France for example, described the shelling as a barbaric act; Washington described the shelling as a deplorable Syrian act.[26] Consequently, the shelling stopped due to the international pressure; the turmoil cooled off between January and March due to heavy snow storms the city endured during the winter of 1980 - 1981.[27] The two sides, however, remained alert while preparing for the upcoming conclusive battle.
The dire socio-political situation of Zahleh alarmed the LF command post in Beirut. A weighty LF presence, however, was scarce in and around the turmoiled city. In addition to the impeding Syrian siege, the initial setbacks coincided with a harsh snowy winter. The siege and the rugged snowy mountains encumbered the LF and hindered the ability of trained elite resistant fighters to come from Beirut to aid local Zahlawis and local LF Nonetheless, commander in chief of the LF, Bachir Gemayel, dispatched his chief of staff Dr. Fouad Abou Nader to asses the dire situation in Zahleh. Reaching the city was problematic for Abou Nader on two levels: in addition to the cold winter and the heavy snow descending on the highest city of Lebanon, the Syrians controlled most of the main roads leading in and out of the city. To reach the city safely without being compromised by the Syrians, Abou Nader had to take foot trails and walk down the mountain in the snow, cutting down through the el-Berdawni river (Arabic: نهر البردوني). Upon reaching town, Abou Nader noticed that, although the Syrians blocked the northern access leading in and out the city, the southern access, in particular the Chtaura road was nevertheless open to circulation.[28] To that end, arms were smuggled inside the city, hidden in trucks carrying loads of wheat.[29] 120 trained elite members from the LF Central Units marched from Beirut to Zahleh to aid and mobilize the 1500 Local resistance fighters and the citizens of zahleh, to prepare for the final battle[30]
During the preparations, the LF, helped by the townspeople, dug trenches around the city to fortify their front-lines.[31] On March 31, 1980, the Syrians fired on one of the digging Bulldozers.[32] The LF aided by the local city resistance fired back, triggering the conclusive battle that lasted till June 30 of 1980.[33] At the height of the battle, the strategic hills around Mount Sannine and the so called French Room located up on the mount peak, fell to the Syrians.[34] The hills and the mount peak, were key positions that overlooked the City. Consequently, the LF fighters were trapped, encircled inside the city. This not only stifled their freedom to move, but also cut off there supplies, making them an easier target for the Syrians as they now held key positions on a higher altitude. This greatly solidified the risks of the city falling in the hands of the Syrians. Consequently, Bachir contacted the men on the frontlines to give them an ultimatum – either retreat and surrender, or die.[35] The fighters disavowed by remaining in their key-positions to further defend the city.[36] To that end, despite the burdening siege and the heavy shelling, the local resistance and the LF elite units were able to hold off the Syrians from any potential intrusion to the city for three consecutive months.[37]
U.S. President at the time Ronald Reagan feared the externalities of Zahleh’s unrest spilling onto Syria and Israel, triggering a regional war between the two nations. As a result, he despatched diplomat Philipe Habib to the region. Habib tackled the dire and complicated socio-political situation in a compelling manner. He proposed a cease-fire agreement to the opposing sides, hoping the agreement would potentially end the onslaughts.[38] The cease-fire agreement stipulated the following: Syria would stop the shelling, lift the siege, and guarantee that its troops would not invade the City; In return LF non-Zahlawi fighters would retreat back to Beirut and hand over their positions and artilleries to the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF).[39] Both opposing sides agreed to the terms respectively.[40] To that end, Syria guaranteed the safety of the retreating LF elite fighters, given they had to pass through Syrian controlled territories to reach their East-Beirut enclave.[41] On June 30, 1891, 600 ISF members replaced LF key-positions across the front-lines.[42] The LF respectively left Zahleh and headed back to their Christian Enclave.[43] Upon their return, Bachir hailed the fighters, awarding them medals of honor; by virtue of blocking off the omnipotent syrian war machine, despite their scarce numbers.[44]